This article returns to the beginning of the Schmotzer case. Not with the knowledge of what would later happen in court, but from the perspective of the time itself. What matters at every stage is only what was known, verifiable and capable of being substantiated at that particular moment.
The investigation we follow on this basis is fictional in the way it is reconstructed. The underlying events are not. Where information is established, we treat it as fact. Where there is only a statement, it remains a statement. Where something cannot be determined, it remains open. Incriminating and exculpatory circumstances are assessed by the same standard.
2 May 2026 – A Report to the Police
On 2 May 2026, two teenagers from the Kitzbühel district go to the police in Fieberbrunn. They have received a video via a messaging service and show it to the officers. The recording is secured. This marks the beginning of an investigation whose eventual scope no one can yet foresee.
The video shows several people and a cat. It contains actions that give rise to the suspicion that the treatment and killing of an animal may have criminal relevance. But the recording shows only a fragment of what happened. It explains neither what came before nor the role of each individual who can be seen or heard.
The investigators’ first task is therefore to turn these images into a verifiable set of facts. They must establish who can be identified in the recording, where it was made and when the events took place. They must also determine who filmed it and which people were actually involved in the actions documented.
The video has a clear limitation. It can show only what happened while the camera was recording. Whatever occurred beforehand is not visible. At this point, there is therefore no established answer as to how the cat came to be in this situation or why the people present acted as they did.
Those gaps cannot be filled with assumptions. Neither the impact of the images nor the reactions they provoke in the viewer answer the questions that a criminal investigation must resolve.
An investigation does not begin once a story can be told in full. It begins precisely where essential parts of that story are still missing.
Nor is the criminal responsibility of any individual clear on 2 May. The fact that several people can be seen or heard on a recording says nothing yet about what specific allegation might later be brought against whom. The individuals must first be identified and their respective actions considered separately.
The report made by the two teenagers therefore settles nothing. There is no finished legal assessment. There is a video recording, a potentially criminal set of events, and enough unanswered questions to justify an investigation.
Police begin identifying people, locating witnesses and clarifying the circumstances. Only this work will show what can be confirmed from the images, what new questions arise and where no unequivocal answer may ultimately be possible.
13 May 2026 – The Images Begin to Take Shape
Eleven days have passed since the two teenagers brought the video to police. Investigators have meanwhile questioned people, located witnesses and begun identifying those behind the images. On 13 May, it becomes publicly known for the first time that there is a suspect. Police say little more. The investigation is ongoing, and details are withheld for investigative reasons.
Eleven days earlier, the recording showed faces, voices and actions whose broader context was largely unknown. Now that picture is slowly beginning to change. One person has been identified; witnesses may be able to describe what they saw or heard. The anonymity of the short recording is beginning to dissolve.
For investigators, this is not simply a matter of attaching names to faces. They must understand what role each person actually played. What did someone do themselves, what did they merely observe, what did they say? And which of those things can be independently confirmed?
Police still know only parts of what happened. The video is one part; statements from people who have since been identified are others. Only when those pieces can be connected — or when contradictions between them become visible — can a reliable factual picture emerge.
That point has not yet been reached on 13 May. There is one suspect, witnesses and a recording whose background remains under investigation. Who the other people are and what significance their conduct may have had is not yet publicly known.
The investigation continues.
14 May 2026 – Four Young Men
One day later, the situation has changed considerably. Police have now identified four Austrian nationals aged between 16 and 24. They voluntarily appear at Westendorf police station and are questioned.
One suspect has become four accused persons. For the first time, investigators can do more than examine what a camera recorded. They can question the people who were there, compare their accounts with one another and then place those statements alongside the video.
Following the interviews, police state that all four admitted involvement and showed remorse. At first glance, that wording sounds more conclusive than it necessarily is in criminal proceedings. What matters is what each individual actually admitted. Participation in a common event does not by itself establish what precise action a person carried out or what legal responsibility might follow from it.
Their remorse likewise tells us something about their attitude after the event. For the investigation, however, another question is more important: What did each person know and intend at the moment he acted? At this stage, there is still no final answer.
The location can now also be narrowed down. According to the state of the investigation at the time, the incident is believed to have taken place on a gravel area in Brixen im Thale. The images now have a place, and the investigation has another fixed point.
The four young men know from their own memory what happened. The police do not yet know. They must reconstruct it. And now the part of the story that the recording does not show becomes increasingly important: what happened beforehand.
How did the cat come to that place? What condition was he in? Who saw him first? What happened next? And how did the decision ultimately arise to kill the animal? For the first time, the accused can provide answers to those questions.
But answers are not yet findings of fact. They must be compared with what other people say, what can be seen in the video and what may be verified through other evidence. The same standard applies to statements made by the accused as to any other information. They do not become true simply because several people tell the same story. But neither do they become false merely because they come from accused persons.
By the evening of 14 May, police therefore know considerably more than they did on the day the report was made. Four people have been identified, they have submitted to questioning and admitted their involvement. The likely location of the incident can be narrowed down, and for the first time investigators have statements from the people who were themselves present.
Until now, the main task has been to determine who stood behind the images. Investigators can now begin comparing the four identified individuals with what can be seen and heard on the video. Four accused persons therefore become four different roles within the same event.
Only now can the more precise question be asked: who did what — and what can actually be proved?
14 May 2026 – Four Names, Three Clear Roles and One Open Question
From this point onward, our reconstruction needs names. Not the real names of the four accused, but fictional names that allow us to follow their statements and actions through the rest of the investigation. We will call them Daniel Gruber, Lukas Berger, Matthias Hofer and Simon Leitner. The names are entirely fictional; ages, roles and all actions described are used only where they can be substantiated from the sources examined.
Police now know the identities of all four. They also have the video and can compare what is visible and audible with the statements made by the accused. This means the four can no longer be viewed merely as a group. Individual actions can be attributed to individual people — although not with the same degree of certainty in every case.
Daniel Gruber is the youngest, aged 16. During the recording, he does not appear as a fourth man in front of the camera because he is the person filming. Information later published about the proceedings also attributes laughter to him and an instruction to another accused to strike the cat once more with the shovel. For investigators, his role therefore has two different dimensions: he documents the event and he speaks during it. What criminal significance that may have is not yet decided.
Matthias Hofer is, in our reconstruction, the accused who was trained as a butcher. The recording shows the captive-bolt device being used against the cat’s head. The same accused later performs the throat cut. His training as a butcher is initially nothing more than information about his professional background. It does not yet answer what knowledge or experience he possessed regarding the use of a captive-bolt device on a cat.
Simon Leitner is the accused to whom the shovel blows are attributed. After the captive-bolt shot, he strikes the cat several times. Later in the sequence, Daniel can be heard telling him to strike again. At that point, the cat’s body is visibly moving. What those movements mean cannot be determined from the images alone. The recording documents the movements and the blows; whether the animal was still conscious or capable of feeling pain remains unanswered.
Lukas Berger is the fourth accused. And his position demonstrates precisely why this reconstruction must operate under strict rules. Public descriptions of the video indicate that Schmotzer is restrained by one of the men before the captive-bolt shot. Yet the sources we have examined do not allow us to identify with sufficient certainty which of the four performed that action. We therefore do not attribute it to Lukas. His specific individual role remains open at this point.
The investigators are therefore not dealing with four men whose conduct was identical. Three roles can already be clearly distinguished: one films and speaks, one uses the captive-bolt device and the knife, and one strikes with the shovel. In the case of a fourth accused, the precise individual act must still be clarified through the available evidence. In addition, one of the men restrains Schmotzer during the incident, although the source material currently available to us does not permit a reliable attribution of that action to a particular person.
Those differences will become more important to the further proceedings than the simple fact that all four were present during the same event. Criminal responsibility does not arise merely because several people are standing in the same place. It must follow from the conduct of each individual.
The video can establish a great deal, but far from everything. It shows actions, their sequence, movements of the animal, and contains voices and sounds. What it does not show are thoughts, intentions or what the men knew at that moment. The recording can therefore be the starting point of an investigation, but not a complete explanation.
The Explanation Given by the Four
The interviews now provide the first account of what allegedly happened before the recording began. The four accused admit killing the cat. At the same time, they state that they had found the animal already injured and wanted to end his suffering. According to later published reports, they gave this explanation during their first police interviews.
That changes the case.
Until now, police primarily possess a recording of what happened at the end. They now have an explanation for why, according to those involved, the situation arose in the first place. That explanation may be true. It may be incomplete. Individual elements may be capable of confirmation or contradiction. At this stage, however, it is first and foremost the common account provided by the four accused.
Two separate questions arise for investigators.
The first concerns an objective condition: Was Schmotzer injured, and if so, how severely?
The second concerns the men’s intention: Did they genuinely intend to relieve an injured animal of its suffering?
The first question may perhaps be investigated through witnesses, traces or expert findings. The second must be assessed through statements, circumstances and the conduct of each accused.
The video cannot answer the first question. It shows only the final 55 seconds of the cat’s life and leaves open what condition he had been in beforehand. For precisely that reason, the accused men’s account must neither be accepted prematurely nor rejected solely because of the effect of the images.
The investigation must now return to the place where the camera was not yet recording: to where Schmotzer is said to have been found, to his condition, to possible witnesses and to the question of how the four men came to the decision to kill him themselves.
The focus therefore shifts away from the recording alone. The investigation now concerns the story before the camera was switched on — and the question of which elements of that story can be independently confirmed.
The Story Before the Camera
The statements of the four accused open up for investigators, for the first time, a part of the events that the video itself does not show. Daniel Gruber, Lukas Berger, Matthias Hofer and Simon Leitner admit involvement in killing the cat. At the same time, they say Schmotzer was already injured. They claim they did not want to torment him, but to relieve him of his suffering.
The incident now has a backstory.
At least, a possible one.
Because what the four men describe initially comes from the very people whose conduct police are investigating. That makes their statements neither true nor false. It means only that they must be tested before a common account can become an established fact.
The first question at the centre of that inquiry appears simple:
Was Schmotzer actually injured?
The video cannot provide a reliable answer. It shows the final 55 seconds of his life. Whatever happened before then lies outside the recording. The images cannot reveal where Schmotzer came from, what condition he was in beforehand or whether he had injuries that may not be visible on the video.
The evidential power of the camera therefore ends precisely where the explanation provided by the four begins.
For investigators, that means looking away from the images and going further back. They must try to find out where Schmotzer was before the recording, whether anyone saw him and whether observations exist that might reveal something about his physical condition. The four accused must also explain more precisely what they themselves perceived and why they concluded that the cat was injured.
It may indeed be significant if their accounts are consistent with one another. Consistency, however, does not replace independent confirmation. Four similar descriptions may reflect the same actual events. But they may also arise from the same shared experience and the same collective memory.
For that reason, every piece of information originating outside that circle becomes important.
Someone who saw Schmotzer beforehand. An observation of his behaviour. A recording. A trace. Anything capable of saying something about his condition before the camera was switched on.
Whether investigators will find anything of that kind remains unknown.
Perhaps the account given by the four can be confirmed. Perhaps only part of it can. Perhaps this very question will remain unresolved. That, too, would be a result with which any later proceedings would have to live.
This is precisely where restraint becomes essential. The fact that the video does not document injuries before the recording began does not prove that Schmotzer was uninjured. Conversely, the statements of the four do not yet prove that he was seriously injured.
Between those possibilities lies a gap.
And that gap must not be filled with whatever anyone would prefer to believe.
Investigators must try to close it with facts. Where that cannot be done, it must remain open.
Only once the most reliable possible picture of Schmotzer’s condition has been established can the next question be asked. Not whether the explanation given by the four sounds credible, but what they actually concluded from the cat’s condition.
Because between recognising that an animal is injured and deciding to kill it oneself lies another step.
And that is where the next part of the investigation begins.
The Decision to Kill Schmotzer
If the account given by the four accused is correct, the starting point is an injured animal. Even then, however, what followed does not explain itself. Between perceiving an injury and deciding to kill an animal lies a decision. Investigators must therefore establish how that decision arose and what role each individual played in it.
During their police interviews, the four admitted being involved in killing the cat. At the same time, they stated that Schmotzer had been injured and that they wanted to relieve him of his suffering. For the first time, there is therefore a stated reason for their actions.
But that reason must also be investigated.
Whether there was in fact a shared decision to kill the animal, or whether the idea initially came from one individual, must be reconstructed from the four men’s statements. Who proposed killing Schmotzer? What did the others say? Was any alternative discussed? The information publicly known at this point does not answer those questions.
Once again, it is essential to separate the four accused.
Daniel later films the incident and speaks during it.
Simon will use the shovel.
Matthias will use the captive-bolt device and the knife.
Lukas’s precise role remains unclear.
By the time the recording begins, however, one decision is already being implemented: Schmotzer is to be killed. How that decision was reached, who initiated it and who agreed with it remains unresolved.
Another question arises from the captive-bolt device. Matthias eventually uses it to kill the cat. Investigators must therefore ask why the device was available in the first place and why that particular method was chosen. At this point, no more can safely be said.
Nor may the use of such a device automatically be taken as evidence of an intention to torture an animal. But neither does the opposite follow from it. A tool does not explain why it is used. What matters is what Matthias and the others believed its use was intended to achieve.
That leads to another question: What alternatives were considered before the men acted themselves?
If their account is correct and they genuinely believed Schmotzer to be seriously injured, investigators must establish whether anyone discussed seeking help or handing the animal over to someone capable of assessing his condition.
Whether any of the four attempted to contact a veterinarian, whether that option was discussed or why it may have been rejected remains unclear at this stage.
That is precisely why the question belongs in the investigation rather than in the realm of assumption.
Investigators are now faced with two parts of the event that still need to be connected. The first concerns the backstory described by the accused: a cat they say they found injured and wanted to relieve of suffering. The second begins where the camera starts recording: with a captive-bolt device, blows from a shovel and finally a knife.
Whether those two parts truly fit together in the way the accused describe cannot be determined from their explanation alone. Investigators must reconstruct the path between them: from perceiving a possibly injured animal, through the decision to kill it, to the moment the recording begins.
And even if investigators initially accept the accused men’s explanation as a possible working hypothesis — that Schmotzer was to be killed in order to end his suffering — that says nothing yet about how the killing was actually carried out.
That is where the detailed examination of the 55 seconds at the heart of the investigation begins.
The 55 Seconds
We now come to the detailed examination of the 55 seconds that form the core of the further investigation. The recording cannot explain what happened beforehand, but it has one decisive advantage over statements made by those involved: what happens in front of the camera during those seconds does not have to be reconstructed from memory.
That does not mean the video speaks for itself. A camera records movement, actions and sound. It does not explain their cause or the thoughts of the people carrying them out. Investigators must therefore begin by recording as soberly as possible what can actually be seen and heard.
At the beginning of the documented killing, Schmotzer is with the men and is restrained by one of those present. Which of our four accused performs that action remains open because the public sources we have examined do not permit the attribution to be made with sufficient certainty. The fact that the cat is restrained, however, forms part of the documented sequence.
Daniel Gruber is holding the mobile phone. The 16-year-old therefore remains largely behind the camera during the recording. His role is not limited to documenting what happens: his laughter can also be heard on the audio track.
In front of the camera, Matthias Hofer places the captive-bolt device against Schmotzer’s head and fires it. For investigators, only that act can initially be established. Whether the device was positioned correctly, what physical effect the shot had and what state of consciousness Schmotzer was in immediately afterwards cannot be answered simply by watching the video.
After the captive-bolt shot, the cat’s body begins to convulse. Those movements are visible and therefore form part of the evidence. What they mean medically remains entirely open.
At precisely this point, the investigation must resist a temptation. Anyone watching the footage may intuitively interpret the movements as evidence of pain or consciousness. Such an impression does not replace an expert finding. Nor may anyone, without specialist knowledge, simply assert that they are meaningless reflexes.
The camera shows movement.
It does not show the medical cause of that movement.
While Schmotzer continues to move, Simon Leitner uses the shovel. He strikes the animal several times. Again, the action itself must initially be separated from its possible significance: the blows are documented; what they cause and why Simon delivers them still has to be investigated.
The audio track therefore also takes on particular importance. It is not merely background sound accompanying the images, but evidence in its own right. Words can show that someone perceived an event, reacted to it or attempted to influence another person’s subsequent conduct.
The same rule therefore applies to Daniel as to the other three accused: the investigation concerns not his personality but his specific behaviour during the event. The fact that he films and laughs during the recording must not become a character assessment. But neither should it simply disappear from the evidence because laughter alone does not establish a particular intention.
The sequence does not end there.
After the captive-bolt shot and the shovel blows, Matthias places a knife against Schmotzer’s neck and cuts his throat. Within the same short recording, the use of the captive-bolt device is therefore followed by another method intended to bring about or ensure the death of the animal.
For investigators, the essential sequence can now be recorded:
Schmotzer is restrained.
Matthias uses the captive-bolt device.
The cat’s body convulses.
Simon strikes the animal with a shovel.
Daniel films and can be heard on the audio track.
Finally, Matthias cuts the cat’s throat.
That is considerably more than investigators knew at the beginning.
And yet precisely those questions that may later prove decisive for criminal-law assessment remain unanswered.
What did the captive-bolt shot actually do?
Was Schmotzer unconscious afterwards?
Could he still experience pain?
What is the significance of the movements of his body?
What effect did the shovel blows have?
Was Schmotzer still alive when the throat cut was made?
And did any of those involved know or recognise anything about the animal’s actual condition during those seconds?
Those questions cannot be answered merely because the images have a powerful emotional impact. But nor can they disappear because the accused say they merely wanted to put Schmotzer out of his suffering.
The men’s account and the recording are two different pieces of evidence.
Both must now be measured against what can actually be established.
The video therefore possesses an unusual strength and, at the same time, a clear limitation. It records actions that cannot later be argued away. But wherever visible movement is to become a statement about consciousness, pain or the time of death, the competence of the camera ends.
At this point, careful observation is no longer enough.
Investigators need someone capable of explaining what happens inside a cat’s body when a captive-bolt device is used, what reactions may follow and how the subsequent acts should be assessed medically.
Only then can those visible 55 seconds become more than a sequence of images.
The most important piece of evidence in the case therefore leads directly to the next decisive question: What does veterinary medicine say about what can be seen in this video?
Part 8 – The Expert
At this point, the images alone are no longer enough. Investigators can watch the video repeatedly, slow down every movement, record the sequence of events and listen to the audio again and again. But eventually they reach the moment when careful observation is no longer sufficient.
Because what happens inside Schmotzer’s body after the captive-bolt shot cannot be decided with the eyes.
The recording is therefore submitted to a veterinary expert. He, too, receives a fictional name in our reconstruction. We will call him Dr Martin Seidl.
His task is not to decide whether the four accused are guilty or innocent. He is to explain what veterinary medicine can say about those 55 seconds — and just as importantly, to state clearly what cannot be determined with certainty from the available material.
His work also begins with a limitation.
Dr Seidl cannot make a reliable statement from the video about Schmotzer’s condition before the recording began. Whether the cat had previously been injured, how serious any injuries were and what treatment options may have existed cannot be answered by the footage. The expert can therefore initially assess only what the camera actually recorded.
The captive-bolt shot is central.
Matthias places the device against the cat’s head and fires it.
The expert assessment indicates that the shot was probably not carried out correctly.
That is an important finding because a captive-bolt shot, when properly administered, is intended to render an animal unconscious. Whether this actually happened to Schmotzer cannot, however, be determined with certainty from the video.
After the shot, Schmotzer’s body displays pronounced and forceful movements. To someone watching the recording, it may appear obvious that the cat is still conscious, reacting and possibly experiencing pain. The images are immediate and powerful.
An expert, however, must distinguish between what a movement suggests emotionally to a viewer and what can medically be inferred from it.
Such convulsions can also occur when an animal is already unconscious. Muscular movements and spasms can be caused by physical processes that do not require conscious perception.
The fact that Schmotzer’s body moves therefore does not medically prove that he was conscious at that moment or experiencing pain.
But neither does it establish that he was no longer capable of perception.
That distinction becomes decisive for the investigation.
The movements are visible and therefore form part of the evidence. Their medical significance cannot be determined from the recording alone with the necessary degree of certainty.
It cannot safely be concluded that Schmotzer was consciously experiencing pain.
Nor can that possibility be excluded.
Two findings therefore stand side by side without cancelling one another out.
The captive-bolt shot was probably not performed correctly.
At the same time, the expert cannot reliably determine Schmotzer’s state of consciousness and sensory perception immediately afterwards.
It is precisely this combination that makes the subsequent assessment more difficult. A recognisable defect in the execution does not by itself answer what the animal actually perceived.
The shovel blows must be considered under the same reservation.
Simon strikes Schmotzer several times while the cat’s body is still convulsing. The act itself is documented by the recording. Its physical significance for the cat, however, depends decisively on whether Schmotzer was unconscious and insensible or whether consciousness and pain perception remained.
That is exactly what Dr Seidl cannot determine with certainty from the available material.
He can describe the physical states that are possible and the reactions that may occur after a captive-bolt shot. But he cannot turn a medical possibility into certainty merely because a clear answer would be useful to the proceedings.
The shovel blows therefore lose none of their relevance. They remain documented acts that will later have to be examined in connection with Simon’s knowledge, his perception of the movements and the purpose of his actions.
Those questions cannot be answered by veterinary medicine.
Veterinary medicine can only describe the physical framework within which the conduct of those involved must later be assessed legally.
At the end of the recording, Matthias places a knife against Schmotzer’s neck and makes the throat cut. Here too, the medical assessment depends substantially on the state the cat was in after the captive-bolt shot and the subsequent blows.
The captive-bolt method is generally intended to render an animal unconscious. What Matthias himself believed about the effect of the device and what precisely he intended to achieve by using the knife afterwards cannot be inferred from that fact alone.
That does not belong in the expert report.
It belongs later in the assessment of his statements and conduct.
Precisely because doubts already exist about whether the captive-bolt shot was carried out properly, it cannot simply be assumed that everything following it occurred as it would have following correct application.
But neither may those doubts be converted automatically into the conclusion that Schmotzer consciously experienced everything that followed.
Here too, the available material does not permit a reliable finding.
The expert report therefore provides no simple answer.
And that is precisely what makes it valuable.
It does not confirm that the 55 seconds were painless for Schmotzer.
But neither does it prove that he remained conscious and experienced pain after the captive-bolt shot.
It records that the shot was probably not properly carried out and that the subsequent visible movements may have had more than one medically possible cause.
For investigators, such a result may initially seem unsatisfactory.
Investigations seek clarity.
At this point, the expert describes limits.
But that is precisely his task.
An expert must not manufacture certainty where the evidence cannot provide it. He must say what can be established professionally and just as clearly identify where reliable conclusions are no longer possible.
Those limits belong to the truth of a criminal case just as much as the things that can be established with certainty.
The view of the 55 seconds now changes again.
The recording still shows the same sequence: captive-bolt shot, movements of the cat, shovel blows, a shouted instruction and the throat cut.
But investigators now know more precisely what can be inferred medically from those images and where they fail to provide a definitive answer.
That does not make the recording less important.
It makes its significance more precise.
The statements of the four accused are now available. The sequence of the video has been reconstructed, the individual roles separated as far as possible, and the expert has explained what can be said about the physical processes and where the limits of reliable medical determination lie.
A new phase of the investigation now begins.
The question is no longer simply what happened to Schmotzer during those 55 seconds.
The question is now which of those actions may be relevant under Austrian criminal law — and what can actually be alleged against each of the four accused with the necessary degree of certainty.
Part 9 – From Facts to Criminal Suspicion
Until this point, investigators have attempted to maintain a distinction that is essential in every criminal case.
First, they had to establish what actually happened.
The statements of the four accused were separated from what the video itself shows. Their individual roles were distinguished as far as possible, and a veterinary expert described which physical processes can be inferred from the images and where the evidence no longer allows a reliable medical conclusion.
Now a different kind of work begins.
The public prosecutor must turn the facts into a possible criminal allegation.
This still does not mean anticipating a verdict. The prosecution must instead determine whether the facts have been sufficiently clarified and whether the available evidence supports a suspicion strong enough to justify asking a court to decide the matter.
Under Section 210 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, charges are to be brought where, on the basis of sufficiently clarified facts, a conviction appears likely and there is no reason to discontinue the proceedings. Where the case is heard by a single judge of the Regional Court, this is done by means of a Strafantrag, a formal charging document.
The question therefore changes.
At this stage, the prosecution does not need to prove that conviction is inevitable.
But neither may it bring an accusation before a court merely because the events provoke outrage.
Its actual task lies between those two extremes: to identify, from the available evidence, which criminal acts are supported with sufficient weight and to whom they can be attributed.
Section 222 of the Austrian Criminal Code is central.
It covers, among other things, anyone who cruelly mistreats an animal or inflicts unnecessary suffering upon it. Section 222(3) additionally criminalises the wanton killing of a vertebrate animal.
The wording itself shows that there is more than one possible criminal-law approach to the 55 seconds.
Different statutory alternatives must be examined separately.
That distinction becomes particularly important because the veterinary expert was unable to answer one question with certainty.
The movements Schmotzer displayed after the captive-bolt shot do not permit a reliable conclusion as to whether he was still conscious and experiencing pain.
For the question of unnecessary suffering, that uncertainty is significant.
But it must not result in Section 222(1) being discarded prematurely as a whole.
Because cruel mistreatment constitutes a separate statutory alternative.
The Austrian Supreme Court does not equate this term with every improper treatment of an animal. Its case law describes conduct whose nature and circumstances allow an inference of a callous attitude on the part of the person acting.
Whether that condition might be fulfilled in the Schmotzer case must therefore be examined independently of whether the cat’s actual pain after the captive-bolt shot can be proved.
For the prosecution, this means looking at the documented acts again — this time through a legal lens.
Matthias uses the captive-bolt device and later performs the throat cut.
Simon repeatedly strikes the cat’s moving body with the shovel.
Daniel films and tells Simon to strike again.
Lukas’s precise role remains less clearly established than those of the others.
Each of those actions must be examined to determine whether it fulfils an offence or contributes to the commission of one.
It would be a mistake to treat cruel mistreatment merely as a fallback if pain cannot be proved.
It has its own legal meaning.
It would be equally wrong to infer that the offence has been fulfilled simply from the severity of the images.
Here too, the objective act, the statutory elements and the required intent all have to be established.
Criminal law offers no shortcut from disturbing footage to conviction.
At this point, another possibility enters the analysis.
Under Section 15 of the Austrian Criminal Code, intentional offences are generally punishable at the attempt stage. An attempt begins when the offender manifests the decision to commit the offence through conduct immediately preceding or constituting its execution.
The prosecution must therefore at least examine whether an attempted offence may be relevant where the intended consequence of an act cannot be medically proved with certainty.
That would, however, require the corresponding criminal intent to be established from the evidence.
This is not a legal back door for replacing a missing fact.
An attempt requires particularly close examination of what the accused intended to achieve.
If it cannot be established that Schmotzer consciously suffered as a result of a particular act, that does not automatically create an attempted offence.
Only if the evidence also sufficiently supports the conclusion that the person intended to bring about the prohibited consequence, or at least seriously considered it possible and accepted that possibility, does the attempt become relevant.
The question becomes more difficult still when it comes to the wanton killing of a vertebrate animal.
Schmotzer was a vertebrate and was killed.
Yet that alone is not sufficient for Section 222(3).
The statute additionally requires the killing to be wanton.
On 18 March 2026, the Austrian Administrative Court expressly emphasised that this concept is narrower than killing an animal “without reasonable cause” under animal-welfare legislation.
Not every killing for which no sufficient reasonable cause can be identified is therefore automatically a wanton killing for the purposes of criminal law.
For our investigation, that decision is striking because it was handed down only a few weeks before the Schmotzer case.
It forces the prosecution to examine the subjective element even more closely.
It is not sufficient to conclude later that a different course of action might have been more reasonable. The additional element of wantonness required by Section 222(3) must be examined.
The Administrative Court expressly stresses that the two provisions differ in their requirements, particularly on the subjective side of the offence.
The accused men’s explanation that they intended to relieve Schmotzer of his suffering therefore assumes particular importance.
It is not an acquittal contained in a single sentence.
But if that motivation genuinely underlay their conduct, it may speak against the conclusion that the killing was wanton.
The prosecution must therefore examine whether their explanation fits the remaining evidence.
The cat’s alleged injuries, the manner in which the decision was reached, the killing method chosen, the statements made during the recording and the conduct of each individual must all be considered together.
The laughter audible on the video also finds its proper place here.
It would be too much to infer wantonness or a specific motive from laughter alone.
Laughter does not provide direct access to a person’s thoughts.
But it would be equally difficult to justify excluding the audio track entirely.
Internal states frequently have to be inferred in criminal proceedings from external circumstances.
The decisive issue is therefore not a single sound, but the overall picture within which it occurs.
Alongside Section 222, another central provision leads directly to the four different roles.
Section 12 of the Austrian Criminal Code does not treat only the person who physically carries out an offence as an offender. It also covers people who induce another person to commit the offence or otherwise contribute to its commission.
Case law recognises that such contribution may also consist of psychological assistance.
This distinction becomes particularly important in Daniel’s case.
The fact that he holds the mobile phone and films does not, by itself, make him an offender in the crime of animal cruelty.
The question is different when it comes to his instruction to strike the cat once more with the shovel.
If that statement was intended consciously to encourage the further act of another and actually did so, it may constitute criminally relevant participation.
Whether those conditions are met again depends on what offence the further blow constituted or attempted to constitute and what Daniel intended.
A similar principle applies to Lukas.
The fact that his visible role remains unclear does not automatically end every further inquiry into possible responsibility.
Mere presence is not enough.
But if statements or other evidence establish that he consciously assisted a criminal act, Section 12 may become relevant.
Conversely, his participation cannot simply be constructed from the fact that four people were in the same place.
That is precisely why it was important from the beginning to dissolve the group into four individuals and examine each separately.
A further limitation applies to all forms of participation.
A person who induces or assists another must generally possess the intent required for the underlying offence.
It is not enough that another person commits an offence.
The person who supports it must also satisfy the subjective requirements of liability.
Almost every legal question therefore leads back to something the video cannot directly show:
intent.
Section 7 of the Austrian Criminal Code provides, as a general principle, that criminal liability requires intent unless the law provides otherwise.
Section 5 also recognises conditional intent: a person acts intentionally where he seriously considers the realisation of the statutory offence possible and accepts that possibility.
It now becomes clear why Schmotzer’s visible movements remain so important despite the medical uncertainty.
The prosecution must ask not only what those movements objectively meant.
It must also investigate what those involved believed they meant.
If Simon strikes a convulsing cat, the assessment of his intent does not depend solely on whether Schmotzer was medically still capable of experiencing pain.
It also depends on what condition Simon himself perceived and what he considered possible.
The same applies to Daniel’s instruction to deliver another blow and to Matthias’s subsequent actions after the captive-bolt shot.
This is one of the central differences between the expert and the prosecutor.
The expert can explain that the movements may have been reflexes and that they do not provide a reliable conclusion about consciousness.
The prosecutor must additionally ask whether those acting knew that, assumed it, or instead believed that the animal in front of them was still capable of feeling.
Medical reality and the offender’s perception are two different levels of criminal law.
At the end of this analysis there is still no decision about guilt or innocence.
There is a more sober question.
Have the facts been sufficiently clarified, and is the evidence against one or more of the accused strong enough that conviction for a particular offence appears likely?
That is the standard Section 210 requires the prosecution to apply.
The case can therefore no longer be placed under a single heading.
For Matthias, the prosecution must examine the captive-bolt shot, the throat cut, possible cruel mistreatment, possible unnecessary suffering, wanton killing and intent.
For Simon, the focus lies on the shovel blows and his perception of Schmotzer’s condition.
For Daniel, the central question is whether his instruction to strike again constitutes intentional participation.
And in Lukas’s case, investigators must first establish what he actually did or supported before any criminal allegation can be formulated.
For the first time since the investigation began, it is therefore becoming possible not only to identify what may have happened but to see which concrete allegations the prosecution might actually be able to make against which accused person.
No formal charge has yet been written.
But it can now begin to be conceived.
Four Accused – Four Separate Assessments
The prosecution must now take the common event apart again.
Four people were involved, but that does not automatically create four identical accusations.
From this point onward, the decisive questions are what can actually be attributed to each individual, what he believed about his actions and whether the available evidence is sufficient to construct a legally sustainable allegation.
The purpose is still not to anticipate a conviction.
The prosecution must determine which accusations are sufficiently clarified and supported by evidence to justify submitting them to a court.
Particularly where several people are involved, that means moving away from the impression of a single group and examining every accused person individually.
In Matthias’s case, the starting position is comparatively clear.
Two directly documented acts are attributed to him: use of the captive-bolt device and later the throat cut.
There is therefore no real question as to whether he actively participated.
The question is what criminal significance those acts may have.
Investigators now know that the captive-bolt shot was probably not performed correctly.
At the same time, the expert cannot reliably determine whether Schmotzer remained conscious afterwards and experienced pain.
That uncertainty creates a substantial problem for proving the infliction of unnecessary suffering.
But it does not end the criminal-law analysis because the separate issue of cruel mistreatment remains.
Nor does the cat’s death automatically result in liability for wanton killing.
Matthias’s explanation that Schmotzer was to be relieved of suffering must be considered alongside what can be seen on the recording.
The decisive questions include what Matthias believed about the cat’s condition, what effect he expected from the captive-bolt shot and why he subsequently used the knife.
The subjective dimension increasingly moves to the centre of his case.
Did he believe he was killing a suffering animal as quickly as possible?
Did he recognise that the chosen method might not have worked?
What did Schmotzer’s movements after the shot mean to him?
The recording alone cannot answer those questions.
His statements must therefore be compared with the visible sequence and the expert findings.
Simon’s case has a different focus.
His conduct consists of repeatedly striking Schmotzer with the shovel.
Those blows occur after the captive-bolt shot and while the cat’s body continues to display pronounced movement.
That Simon strikes is documented.
What remains open is how those blows should be assessed legally and what Simon himself believed about the animal’s condition.
Again, the medical uncertainty makes it difficult to prove that the cat actually experienced suffering.
But the blows do not disappear from the criminal-law analysis because of that.
Their nature, repetition and the circumstances in which they occurred must also be examined under the concept of possible cruel mistreatment.
If the necessary intent could be proved, an attempted offence might additionally become relevant.
Simon’s perception at that moment therefore becomes particularly important.
The expert can explain that the visible movements may have been reflexes.
Simon did not have the benefit of that later expert opinion while the event was unfolding.
For the assessment of his intent, investigators must therefore examine what he himself perceived in those movements, or at least considered possible, and why he responded to them by using the shovel.
Daniel’s role differs markedly from those of the two men who physically acted upon the animal.
He uses neither the captive-bolt device, the shovel nor the knife.
He films the incident.
That fact alone cannot establish participation in animal cruelty.
The laughter audible on the recording may be striking to viewers, but on its own it is equally insufficient to establish criminal responsibility.
His instruction to deliver another shovel blow is different.
That statement relates directly to the conduct of another person.
If another blow follows, the prosecution must determine whether Daniel deliberately intended to encourage that act and what legal character the act he encouraged possessed.
A spoken instruction may therefore become more than a mere remark.
But once again, intent is decisive.
Daniel must not merely have known that another blow might follow.
For criminal participation, his own mental state must also encompass the circumstances that would make the supported act criminal in the first place.
His age is another factor.
Daniel is 16 and is therefore subject to juvenile criminal law.
That does not make his conduct irrelevant or remove him in principle from criminal responsibility.
It does mean that any potential liability would later have to be assessed under the special provisions applicable to juveniles under Austrian law.
Lukas remains the most difficult case.
His position demonstrates particularly clearly why the four accused cannot simply be treated as a unit.
His presence is established, but the public evidence examined so far does not allow his concrete act to be determined with the same certainty as those of Matthias, Simon and Daniel.
At this point, the prosecution must exercise restraint.
Presence alone is not participation in a criminal offence.
Nor does the failure to prevent an event automatically amount to criminal contribution.
A concrete allegation would require evidence that Lukas consciously supported, facilitated or otherwise contributed to another person’s criminal act.
If his statements, the video or other evidence were to establish that he restrained Schmotzer or consciously supported another act carried out by the others, his legal position would change.
But as long as that attribution cannot reliably be made, his role must not be supplemented merely to ensure that all four ultimately face equally strong accusations.
That, too, is part of careful investigation.
It must remain possible for the evidence against one accused to be stronger than the evidence against another.
A shared location and a common event do not replace individual proof of participation.
The investigation is therefore beginning to produce a very different picture from the one visible in 55 seconds on a mobile phone at the outset.
Matthias stands at the centre because of two directly performed acts.
Simon’s case concerns the shovel blows and what he believed about the cat’s condition.
Daniel’s case concerns whether his spoken instruction amounts to intentional participation.
Lukas’s potential liability first depends on whether his concrete involvement can be established at all.
The prosecution must now develop from that evidence a decision that is not driven either by the impact of the video or by the explanation given by the accused.
For each of the four, it must determine which facts are reliable, what legal assessment follows and where the evidence itself imposes a limit.
Only then can it decide which allegations actually belong in the formal charge — and which do not.
The Prosecutor’s Decision
The case no longer lies on the table merely as a collection of individual investigative results.
The statements of the four accused are known.
The 55 seconds of video have been broken down into individual acts.
The veterinary expert has described what can be said about Schmotzer’s physical condition and where reliable conclusions reach their limits.
From all those elements, the prosecution must now produce something considerably more sober than the images with which the case began:
a legally sustainable accusation.
The prosecutor also receives a fictional name in our reconstruction.
We will call her Dr Eva Moser.
Her task is not to distribute as many statutory provisions as possible among as many accused people as possible.
She must determine whether the facts have been sufficiently clarified and whether the available evidence supports an allegation strongly enough for it to be submitted to a court.
The same rule that has governed our reconstruction from the beginning applies to Dr Moser.
Incriminating evidence must be examined.
Exculpatory evidence must be examined just as carefully.
A prosecutor must therefore become neither the defence counsel of the accused nor the representative of public outrage.
Her task is to remain with the facts even when they do not produce a simple story.
In Matthias’s case, the analysis begins with something that cannot be disputed.
He uses the captive-bolt device and later performs the throat cut.
The veterinary expert considers the captive-bolt shot probably to have been improperly executed.
At the same time, it cannot reliably be established whether Schmotzer was still conscious afterwards and experienced pain.
Those two findings must remain side by side.
For an allegation of unnecessary suffering, the uncertainty surrounding conscious pain perception creates a serious problem.
But the criminal-law examination does not end there because cruel mistreatment remains a separate possibility.
Dr Moser must therefore consider the significance of the improperly performed captive-bolt shot, the subsequent acts and the surrounding circumstances independently of whether conscious pain can be proved.
But she encounters another point that has so far almost disappeared behind a single occupational description.
Matthias is a trained butcher.
That is a fact.
It is not yet an answer to what he was actually qualified to do or what knowledge he possessed in this particular situation.
Two separate questions arise.
The first concerns assessment of the cat.
What knowledge did Matthias possess that enabled him to assess how badly Schmotzer was injured and whether treatment remained possible?
The second concerns the method of killing.
What training and experience did he have with captive-bolt devices?
On which animal species had he used them?
What did he know about their use on a cat?
This distinction is important.
A person may have learned to stun particular livestock species correctly without therefore being capable of assessing the medical condition of an injured cat.
Likewise, an occupational title does not automatically prove competence to use a particular device properly on every species.
Animal-welfare law also does not treat knowledge and ability in the killing of an animal as irrelevant.
A possible breach of those provisions would not automatically establish guilt under criminal law.
But it may provide indications of what Matthias actually knew, what risks he was aware of and on what basis he made his decision.
Dr Moser must therefore neither use his training automatically against him nor exaggerate it in his favour.
If his training and professional experience included knowledge genuinely relevant to this situation, that belongs in the assessment.
If his experience was limited to different animals and different circumstances, another question arises:
On what basis did he nevertheless believe he could assess Schmotzer’s condition and carry out the killing himself?
His qualifications may therefore also become relevant to intent.
If Matthias knew particular risks associated with an incorrectly positioned captive-bolt device, that knowledge may matter when his conduct is assessed.
If he did not possess that knowledge, a different question arises:
Why did he nevertheless use a method whose proper application he may not have mastered?
The possibility of wanton killing must also be examined in his case.
That Matthias intended Schmotzer to die does not contradict his own account because, according to the accused, the cat was to be killed precisely in order to end his suffering.
But the intentional death of a vertebrate alone is not enough to establish wanton killing.
The additional element of wantonness required by criminal law must be present.
Dr Moser therefore cannot simply disregard the explanation that Schmotzer was to be relieved of suffering.
If that motivation genuinely existed, it may speak against wanton killing.
At the same time, a legally favourable explanation cannot be accepted solely because it is possible.
It must fit the other statements, the conduct of the accused and what the video records.
Simon’s case again has a different focus.
His repeated shovel blows are recorded on video.
They occur after the captive-bolt shot and while Schmotzer’s body continues visibly to move.
Whether the cat consciously perceived those blows cannot be determined medically with certainty.
For Dr Moser, the inquiry cannot stop there.
Cruel mistreatment must be examined independently of whether conscious pain can be proved beyond the necessary threshold.
The nature, repetition and circumstances of the blows must therefore be considered in their own right.
At the same time, the question remains what Simon himself perceived and what purpose he believed his blows served.
The expert can explain that the cat’s movements may have been involuntary reflexes.
Simon, however, did not possess that later expert assessment while the event was taking place.
For the purpose of determining his intent, investigators must establish what condition he himself perceived or at least considered possible and why he responded to the moving body with further blows.
If the completed infliction of unnecessary suffering cannot be sufficiently proved because of the medical uncertainty, the possibility of attempt must not simply be ignored.
But it can only apply if the required intent is supported by the evidence.
Attempt cannot be used to fill a factual gap that genuinely cannot be closed.
Then there is Daniel.
In his case, the temptation is particularly strong to confuse the effect of the video with criminal significance.
He films and laughs.
Both may contribute to the atmosphere of those seconds, but neither alone makes him an offender in animal cruelty.
His instruction to deliver another shovel blow is different in character.
If that instruction occurs during the event and another blow follows, there is a direct connection with another person’s conduct.
Dr Moser must therefore examine whether Daniel intentionally sought to encourage that further blow and what he himself believed was happening to Schmotzer at that moment.
Again, the words alone are not enough.
The decisive question is what conduct Daniel wanted to support and whether his intent encompassed the circumstances that could make the supported act criminal.
Only then can a statement become criminally relevant participation.
Daniel’s age of 16 does not change the fundamental question of possible participation.
It does, however, mean that the special rules of juvenile criminal law apply to him.
What consequences those rules might later have is not yet the issue at this stage of the investigation.
The first question is whether his concrete conduct gives rise to a legally sustainable criminal allegation.
And finally there is Lukas.
Here our reconstruction again reaches a boundary that does not disappear merely because he too was identified as one of those involved.
From public information we know that Schmotzer was restrained by one of the men during the incident.
The sources examined do not allow us to attribute that act to Lukas with sufficient certainty.
The actual investigation had access to a complete case file that we do not possess.
Our fictional prosecutor therefore may not add information simply because it may perhaps have existed in that file.
As long as no concrete act or conscious support of another person can reliably be attributed to Lukas, his mere presence is insufficient.
This is precisely where the same care must operate in favour of an accused person.
If further interviews, a clear video analysis or other evidence were to establish that Lukas restrained Schmotzer or consciously assisted another act, his position would change.
Until such proof exists, however, the gap must remain a gap.
After this assessment, the case looks less uniform than it did on the day the video was brought to police.
In Matthias’s case, the focus is on his own acts, his actual expertise, the quality of the captive-bolt shot and his perception of Schmotzer’s condition.
In Simon’s case, it is the shovel blows and what he recognised or at least considered possible in the cat’s movements.
In Daniel’s case, the assessment centres on his instruction and whether it constitutes intentional participation.
In Lukas’s case, the publicly reconstructable evidence does not yet provide the same clarity.
That is precisely the prosecutor’s task.
She must not make a case smoother than the evidence permits.
She must tolerate differences, acknowledge uncertainty and nevertheless make a decision where the available facts justify one.
Dr Moser’s emerging formal charge therefore cannot simply state that four people jointly did the same thing.
It must distinguish between directly performed acts and possible forms of participation, separate cruel mistreatment from unnecessary suffering, examine attempt where legally and factually appropriate, and weigh the stated motive carefully against the remaining evidence when considering wanton killing.
In Matthias’s case, there is an additional question concerning his actual knowledge and abilities.
His occupational title alone proves neither that he was capable of professionally assessing Schmotzer’s condition nor that he was sufficiently qualified to use the chosen method.
What his training actually included must be established with the same care as every other incriminating or exculpatory fact.
Only now can the prosecution take the final step.
It must select from everything the investigation has produced those accusations that are genuinely supported by the evidence — and leave everything else behind, even where it may initially seem obvious.
The investigation thereby becomes a set of concrete allegations.
And those allegations now become the formal charge.
The Charge That Never Existed in This Form
Until this point, we have tried to look at a real case again from its beginning.
Not with the claim that we possess an investigative file that is unavailable to us.
And not with the aim of reaching, by a different path, an outcome already known in advance.
The starting point has always been what became publicly known, what can be researched responsibly and what can be connected to a verifiable source.
At this final stage, that limitation becomes especially important.
What follows is not a reproduction of the actual Strafantrag filed in the Schmotzer case.
It is an attempt, based on everything publicly known and verifiable about the case, to carry our own fictional investigation to the point at which a prosecutor must make the final decision:
Which specific allegations are sufficiently supported to be placed before a court?
The most important rule of the entire article remains in force.
A published statement does not become a fact simply because it fits the reconstruction.
Contradictory information is not made to fit.
Information that became known later may help us understand which facts, statements or evidence already existed at an earlier time.
But a later judicial assessment cannot retrospectively become knowledge possessed by our fictional prosecutor before the trial.
I do not know the complete investigative file.
I do not have access to unpublished interview records, internal police reports or complete expert opinions.
This reconstruction can therefore only be as complete as the material that is publicly available and verifiable.
What is missing will not be invented.
Why These Questions Matter to Me
For me, this reconstruction is more than a legal thought experiment.
Since I began examining the Schmotzer case, questions have remained that I do not simply want to set aside because the actual criminal proceedings have ended.
I am interested in what happens when the case is viewed again from its beginning.
What questions should an investigation have asked?
What significance does the actual expertise of an involved person have?
What can be inferred medically from the movements of an animal — and what could the people who saw those movements directly have understood or at least considered possible?
When does presence become participation?
When can a statement acquire criminal significance?
And at what point must even a thorough investigation accept that something cannot be known with certainty?
Incriminating circumstances should not be made larger than they are.
But exculpatory circumstances must not disappear merely because they do not fit an already completed narrative.
For that reason, the explanation that Schmotzer had been found injured and that the men wanted to relieve him of suffering belongs in this reconstruction just as much as the video showing the captive-bolt shot, the cat’s movements, the shovel blows, the spoken instruction and the throat cut.
It is also established that the four accused, whose identities were already known at the time, voluntarily appeared at Westendorf police station on 14 May 2026 and that, according to police, they admitted involvement and showed remorse during questioning.
I do not want this exercise to replace a court judgment with my own.
I am interested in something else:
What charge remains if I try to include everything I know about this case that can be responsibly researched and supported by sources — while at the same time leaving out everything I do not know?
Four Accused – But Four Different Evidential Positions
In our fictional formal charge, all four accused appear before the court.
That does not mean the evidential position is the same in every case or that the same acts can be alleged against all four.
In the case of three participants, later published information allows the respective roles to be identified comparatively precisely.
The first accused filmed the incident, laughed and told the fourth accused, who was using the shovel, to strike again.
The third accused, who had been trained as a butcher, used the captive-bolt device and later performed the throat cut.
The fourth accused repeatedly struck the convulsing cat with the shovel.
Those attributions were reproduced in the published account of the Regional Court after the actual proceedings.
The publicly available information concerning Lukas Berger — our fictional name for the second accused — is more difficult.
His membership in the group of four accused is established, as is the fact that he voluntarily appeared at police and that police reported all four as having admitted involvement and expressed remorse.
What cannot be reconstructed with the same degree of precision from publicly available material is the concrete act individually attributed to him in the actual charging document.
Later reports following the completed proceedings do state that another person held or lifted the cat.
But we cannot infer solely by elimination that this person must necessarily have been the second accused.
A plausible inference is not a source.
Our reconstruction therefore reaches a boundary here.
The actual prosecutor had an investigative file and charged all four men.
We do not possess that file.
A real Strafantrag must individualise the accusation. How this was actually done in relation to the second accused cannot reliably be reconstructed from the published material.
That does not mean removing Lukas from the proceedings in our text.
It means something else:
We leave him before the court, but we do not invent what the non-public file may have contained about his concrete contribution to the alleged offence.
Which Offence Our Fictional Prosecution Pursues
Section 222(1)(1) of the Austrian Criminal Code contains two forms of animal cruelty: cruel mistreatment of an animal and the infliction of unnecessary suffering.
The judicial reasoning later made public explained those concepts separately.
Cruel mistreatment requires, among other things, a significant physical assault involving at least brief pain, whereas “suffering” refers to a painful state lasting for a certain period of time.
Our fictional prosecution therefore focuses on attempted cruel mistreatment.
It expressly does not claim that conscious pain after the captive-bolt shot can be proved to have occurred.
The expert findings made public leave that question open.
The theory of attempt begins elsewhere.
Section 15 of the Criminal Code covers intentional offences once the offender manifests the decision to commit the offence through conduct immediately preceding or constituting its execution.
For our construction, the prosecution would therefore have to prove that the respective accused at least possessed conditional intent with regard to the elements required for cruel mistreatment — in particular the possibility of causing pain — and nevertheless acted.
Whether that intent can actually be proved is by no means predetermined.
That is precisely what the trial is intended to decide.
Fictional Formal Charge – Not an Official Document
Journalistic and legal reconstruction. All personal names are fictional. This document was not issued by the Innsbruck Public Prosecutor’s Office or any other Austrian judicial authority and never existed in this form.
To the Innsbruck Regional Court, sitting as a single judge
Following completion of the investigation, the prosecution files a formal charge against the accused referred to in this reconstruction under the fictional names Matthias Hofer, Simon Leitner, Daniel Gruber and Lukas Berger.
Daniel Gruber was 16 years old at the time of the incident.
Further personal data are deliberately omitted from this published reconstruction.
The accused are alleged to have carried out or assisted acts on 30 April 2026 in Brixen im Thale, in connection with the killing of the cat “Schmotzer”, through which the offence of animal cruelty under Section 222(1)(1) of the Austrian Criminal Code, in the form of cruel mistreatment, was at least attempted or the attempt was assisted.
The date, location and the fact that all four were in the actual proceedings charged under Section 222(1)(1) and Section 222(3) are publicly documented.
I. Matthias Hofer
Matthias Hofer is alleged to have used a captive-bolt device against Schmotzer’s head in the course of killing the cat.
The animal’s body continued to display forceful movement afterwards.
Later in the sequence, Matthias performed the throat cut.
These acts correspond to the attribution later published concerning the third accused in the actual proceedings.
According to the veterinary assessment, the captive-bolt shot was with high probability not carried out correctly.
At the same time, it could not be established with the certainty required in criminal proceedings whether the subsequently visible movements represented continued consciousness and pain perception or were caused by involuntary reflex-like muscular spasms.
The fictional prosecution therefore does not allege as an established fact that Schmotzer consciously experienced pain after the captive-bolt shot.
It does, however, allege that Matthias at least seriously considered it possible that the shot had failed fully to produce the intended unconsciousness and insensibility, that further substantial physical acts could therefore cause Schmotzer pain, and that he accepted that possibility.
On that basis, Matthias Hofer is charged in this reconstruction with attempted animal cruelty under Sections 15 and 222(1)(1) of the Austrian Criminal Code, in the form of attempted cruel mistreatment.
Whether the required intent can in fact be proved remains a matter for the trial.
The attempt of intentional offences is governed by Section 15.
His actual professional qualifications are also relevant to the assessment of intent.
It became publicly known that the third accused was a trained butcher.
That occupational description alone does not establish what experience he had in stunning a cat, what knowledge he possessed of feline anatomy or whether he was capable of recognising successful application of a captive-bolt device in this species.
The trial would therefore have to clarify what training and practical experience Matthias actually possessed with such devices, which animal species that experience concerned, how he was able to recognise successful stunning and what significance he attributed to Schmotzer’s movements after the shot.
His occupational title alone is neither proof of guilt nor exculpation.
II. Simon Leitner
Simon Leitner is alleged to have repeatedly struck Schmotzer with a shovel after the captive-bolt device had been used, while the cat’s body continued visibly to convulse.
After those movements persisted following several blows, the filming Daniel Gruber told him to strike again, whereupon Simon delivered a further blow.
This sequence corresponds to the account later published concerning the actual proceedings.
Here too, our fictional prosecution does not claim that Schmotzer demonstrably and consciously perceived the blows.
The expert was unable to determine with certainty whether the movements were associated with consciousness and pain perception or were reflexive.
For an attempted offence, however, a further question arises:
What did Simon himself consider possible at that moment?
He saw the cat’s body continuing to move forcefully after the captive-bolt shot and struck it repeatedly with the shovel.
The fictional prosecution therefore alleges that Simon at least seriously considered it possible that Schmotzer remained capable of perception and that the blows would cause him pain, and that he accepted that possibility.
Simon Leitner is accordingly charged with attempted animal cruelty under Sections 15 and 222(1)(1) of the Austrian Criminal Code in the form of attempted cruel mistreatment.
The contention that the blows were intended solely to bring about the cat’s death as quickly as possible is not treated as disproved by the charge.
Whether that explanation is compatible with the sequence, the number of blows, the video and Simon’s perception is for the court to decide.
III. Daniel Gruber
Daniel Gruber is, at 16, the youngest accused in this fictional formal charge.
He is not accused of personally using the captive-bolt device, the shovel or the knife.
Nor is the act of filming, by itself, treated in our reconstruction as participation in the offence.
The same applies to the documented laughter.
The fictional prosecution assesses differently his instruction that another shovel blow be delivered.
The published account of the actual criminal proceedings expressly attributes to the first accused that he filmed, laughed and told the fourth accused to strike once more with the shovel.
Section 12 of the Austrian Criminal Code also covers other forms of participation in an offence.
Under the case law, that contribution may consist of physical or psychological support, but it must actually enable, facilitate, safeguard or otherwise promote the commission of the offence.
The fictional prosecution regards Daniel’s instruction as psychological encouragement of the subsequent additional blow.
It further alleges that Daniel at least seriously considered it possible that Schmotzer remained capable of experiencing pain at that moment and that the further blow might therefore constitute cruel mistreatment, and that he nevertheless deliberately encouraged its continuation.
Daniel Gruber is therefore charged with participation under Section 12 of the Austrian Criminal Code in attempted animal cruelty under Sections 15 and 222(1)(1), in the form of attempted cruel mistreatment.
Because of his age at the time, the provisions of juvenile criminal law would additionally apply in actual proceedings.
IV. Lukas Berger
In the case of Lukas Berger, this public reconstruction reaches its clearest limit.
It is established that the real second accused was one of the four accused persons.
Like the others, he voluntarily appeared at police.
According to the police statement issued at the time, all four admitted involvement and expressed remorse during questioning.
It is also established that the actual prosecution later charged him with animal cruelty.
What cannot reliably be determined from the publicly available information, however, is the specific act or form of assistance individually attributed to him in that charge.
The judicial reasoning published later cannot retrospectively fill that gap.
It contains findings reached only after the trial had been conducted and the complete evidence assessed.
Those findings include the later judicial conclusion that the men had jointly decided to relieve Schmotzer of his suffering.
That conclusion therefore cannot be treated as knowledge already available in that form to our fictional prosecutor before the trial.
Nor do we attribute to Lukas, merely by elimination, the publicly described act of restraining or holding the cat.
There is no source that unequivocally identifies the second accused as the person who performed that act.
A genuine formal charge would have to go further at this point.
Section 12 of the Austrian Criminal Code does not permit a conviction merely because someone was present during criminal conduct or was generally associated with a group.
There must be an actual contribution to the commission of the offence.
Our reconstruction therefore cannot invent the missing contribution.
Lukas Berger nevertheless remains the fourth accused in this reconstructed formal charge because the real second accused was also charged and his involvement in the actual incident is publicly documented. What concrete criminally relevant act the real prosecution attributed to him cannot, however, be reproduced with sufficient certainty from the public sources available to us.
At this point, a complete reconstruction is no longer possible.
An invented sentence would make the document appear more complete.
But it would undermine the entire standard on which this article rests.
For the later fictional trial, this also means that the defence has a particularly strong point of attack here:
If no concrete contribution to an offence can be proved, mere involvement in the overall event is not sufficient for criminal liability under Section 12 of the Austrian Criminal Code.
Why We Do Not Add an Allegation of Unnecessary Suffering
In the actual proceedings, the charge included both cruel mistreatment and the infliction of unnecessary suffering.
The court later explained that “suffering” requires a painful condition lasting for a certain period of time.
Our public reconstruction cannot reliably determine how long Schmotzer may still have consciously experienced pain after the captive-bolt shot — or whether he consciously experienced pain at all.
We therefore do not convert that uncertainty into an additional allegation.
The fictional charge is limited to attempted cruel mistreatment.
That allegation is by no means easy to prove either because the prosecution would have to establish not only the acts themselves but also the required intent.
But it does not require us additionally to assert a duration of suffering that the source material does not provide.
Nor Do We Charge Wanton Killing
The fictional prosecution has also examined the offence of wanton killing of a vertebrate under Section 222(3) of the Austrian Criminal Code, but does not pursue that allegation.
This does not establish that killing Schmotzer was necessary.
Nor does it decide whether the killing complied with animal-welfare legislation.
Wantonness under criminal law has its own requirements.
In the actual proceedings, the court later explained that wantonness requires more than the mere absence of reasonable cause; the necessary intent must also extend to the relevant elements of the offence.
The accused stated in connection with the proceedings that they wanted to relieve Schmotzer of suffering.
Our fictional prosecution does not possess sufficiently reliable publicly available material to replace that stated motivation with a different motive and then charge that alternative motive as fact.
The later judicial assessment, which likewise accepted a purpose of relieving suffering, cannot be treated as a finding our fictional prosecution could have anticipated during the earlier investigative stage.
The filming, the laughter, the spoken instruction and the overall sequence may all be considered in the overall assessment.
But they do not permit a particular motive for the killing simply to be treated as established.
Evidence for the Trial
To prove the documented sequence, our fictional prosecution requests that the complete secured video recording, including its audio track, be played at trial.
The evidence should address in particular the captive-bolt shot, Schmotzer’s subsequent visible movements, the shovel blows, the instruction to deliver another blow, the throat cut and all other acts and statements identifiable on the recording.
Matthias Hofer, Simon Leitner, Daniel Gruber and Lukas Berger should also be questioned.
The matters to be clarified include their perception of Schmotzer’s condition, how the decision to kill him arose, each individual’s role, the significance they attributed to the movements after the captive-bolt shot and the intentions associated with their own conduct.
In Lukas Berger’s case, the taking of evidence is of particular importance.
Our public reconstruction cannot identify his specific contribution.
An actual trial could draw upon the complete statements and other parts of the case file.
We cannot simulate documents we do not possess.
The veterinary expert — identified in this reconstruction under the explicitly fictional name Dr Martin Seidl — should be heard concerning the manner in which the captive-bolt shot was performed, its possible effects, the causes of the subsequent visible movements and the possibility of continued consciousness and pain perception.
The expert assessment made publicly known was that the captive-bolt shot was probably not performed correctly, while the movements may also have been caused by reflex activity.
In Matthias Hofer’s case, his actual training and practical experience with captive-bolt devices should additionally be examined.
The issue is not his occupational title as such, but the knowledge he genuinely possessed and could rely upon when dealing with a cat.
Application
The prosecution applies for the trial of Matthias Hofer, Simon Leitner, Daniel Gruber and Lukas Berger before the Innsbruck Regional Court sitting as a single judge and for the evidence identified above to be taken.
In relation to Matthias Hofer and Simon Leitner, this reconstruction alleges attempted animal cruelty under Sections 15 and 222(1)(1) of the Austrian Criminal Code, in the form of attempted cruel mistreatment.
Daniel Gruber is alleged to have made a contribution under Section 12 of the Austrian Criminal Code to that attempted offence.
In relation to Lukas Berger, the reconstruction expressly records that the real second accused was also charged, but that the concrete individual contribution attributed to him cannot be reconstructed with sufficient certainty from publicly available sources.
Any more specific allegation would require inventing content from a non-public investigative file.
Under Section 210 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecution brings charges where, on the basis of sufficiently clarified facts, conviction appears likely and there is no reason to discontinue or resolve the case by diversion.
Where the Regional Court sits as a single judge, the charge is filed by means of a Strafantrag.
This formal charge does not establish guilt.
It formulates allegations that a court would have to examine.
What This Formal Charge Means
At the end of our fictional investigation, four accused therefore stand before a court — but not with four equally strong accusations, and not even with four equally complete reconstructed counts.
In Matthias’s case, we know the concrete acts and can additionally examine his actual expertise.
In Simon’s case, the shovel blows are documented.
In Daniel’s case, the instruction to strike again has a direct connection with another person’s conduct.
In Lukas’s case, we know that he belonged to the group of four accused, that he too voluntarily appeared at police and that he too was actually charged.
What we do not know is what precise contribution the prosecution individually attributed to him in its non-public file.
That gap remains visible.
For me, this is a central part of the entire exercise.
Research does not mean that every gap must be closed.
Sometimes the most accurate answer is simply that information is not publicly available.
Replacing it with a reasonable-sounding assumption would turn a reconstruction into an invention.
Nor is conviction by any means certain in relation to the other three accused.
The fictional prosecution would still have to prove, in particular, that Matthias and Simon not only acted but possessed the intent required for attempted cruel mistreatment.
In Daniel’s case, it would additionally have to prove that his spoken instruction constituted intentional participation in precisely that attempt.
A contribution under Section 12 requires actual promotion or assistance of the offence.
The medical uncertainty remains.
We continue not to claim that Schmotzer was demonstrably conscious and experiencing pain after the captive-bolt shot.
It is precisely because that result cannot be established with certainty that our fictional prosecution raises the question of attempt.
For me, the purpose of this entire exercise remains contained in a single sentence:
I did not want to show which charge I would like to see. I wanted to find out which charge remains if I try to include everything I know about this case that can be responsibly researched and supported by sources — while leaving out everything I do not know.
The investigative path we have constructed, the names of the people involved and this specific charging decision are fictional.
The facts on which they rely are not intended to be invented.
Where an act is described, there must be a source behind it.
Where the source ends, invented certainty must not begin.
Our fictional prosecution has therefore not decided that four people are guilty.
It has decided which allegations, on the basis of the publicly reconstructable material, it would place before a court — and it has disclosed where even this reconstruction reaches its limits.
That concludes Part One.
At trial, the prosecution will no longer stand alone.
Opposite it will be a defence entitled to challenge every individual allegation: the facts, the inferences, the alleged intent, the theory of attempt — and, in Lukas’s case, the fundamental question of whether any concrete criminal contribution can be proved at all.
Only then will we see what remains of this charge.
— ◆ —
Note on the Classification of This Article
This article is a journalistic-literary reconstruction of a real criminal case. It is based exclusively on publicly accessible and verifiable information from media reports, publications by authorities and courts, and publicly available Austrian legal sources.
The names used in this article for the accused, the prosecutor, the expert and other persons involved are fictional. Real places, authorities and institutions are named where this is necessary for factual context and concerns publicly documented events.
The investigative course developed in the individual sections and, in particular, the formal charge formulated in Part 12 are fictional. They originate neither from the Innsbruck Public Prosecutor’s Office nor from the Innsbruck Regional Court or any other Austrian judicial authority. The fictional formal charge is a journalistic thought experiment intended to examine what legal assessment might result if only publicly known information is used and gaps in knowledge are not filled with invented facts.
Where actual actions, statements or expert findings are described, they are based on the sources listed below. Where information is not sufficiently supported publicly or an attribution cannot be made, this is expressly identified in the article.
The article does not claim to possess the complete investigative or court file and does not replace either the actual criminal proceedings or the decision of the competent court.
The four defendants in the real proceedings were acquitted on 4 August 2026 by the Innsbruck Regional Court. The acquittals became final. This reconstruction neither overturns nor replaces those judgments, nor does it present them as legally ineffective. The presumption of innocence applies to the real persons concerned.
Legal considerations, suspicions and allegations developed within the fictional reconstruction are identified as such. They do not constitute an assertion that the real individuals committed the criminal offences described in the fictional charge or are criminally responsible for them.
The purpose of this article is a journalistic examination of the publicly known facts, the unanswered questions in the case and the legal possibilities for assessing them. It is not intended to encourage personal attacks, hatred, threats, harassment or any other action directed against participants in the real proceedings.
Sources
- Innsbruck Regional Court: “Medienmitteilung HV Schmotzer”, 4 August 2026. Official media release concerning the proceedings and the four acquittals.
- ORF Tirol: “Katze getötet: Ermittlungen gegen Tierquäler”, 13 May 2026. Contemporary reporting on the beginning of the police investigation, the securing of information and initial questioning.
- ORF Tirol: “Mutmaßliche Tierquäler reuig bei Polizei”, 14 May 2026. Report on the identification of the four accused, their voluntary appearance at Westendorf police station and the police statement that they had admitted involvement and shown remorse.
- ORF Tirol: “Vier Freisprüche im Tierquälerei-Prozess”, 4 August 2026. Report on the proceedings, the expert assessment of the captive-bolt shot and Schmotzer’s movements, and the four final acquittals.
- MeinBezirk Kitzbühel: “Alle vier Angeklagten rechtskräftig freigesprochen”, 4 August 2026. Detailed account of the published judicial presentation, particularly the allegations, the roles attributed to individual defendants and the legal requirements of Section 222 of the Austrian Criminal Code.
- DER STANDARD: Jan Michael Marchart, “Kater ‘Schmotzer’, ein Tierquäler-Prozess und vier Freisprüche – wie konnte es dazu kommen?”, 7 August 2026. Detailed follow-up reporting on the case, including information about the video, the initial statements of the accused, the butcher’s professional experience, the veterinary expert opinion and the legal classification of the proceedings.
- Austrian Administrative Court: Decision Ro 2024/02/0004 of 18 March 2026 concerning the distinction between killing an animal “without reasonable cause” under animal-welfare law and the “wanton killing” of a vertebrate under Section 222(3) of the Austrian Criminal Code.
- Federal Legal Information System – Austrian Criminal Code: in particular Sections 5, 12, 15 and 222 concerning intent, forms of participation, attempt and animal cruelty.
- Federal Legal Information System – Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure: in particular Sections 210, 211 and 484 concerning the requirements for bringing charges, the content of an indictment and the Strafantragbefore the Regional Court sitting as a single judge.
- Federal Legal Information System – Austrian Animal Welfare Act: in particular Sections 6, 15 and 32 concerning killing, the care of injured animals, and slaughter and killing.
- Austrian Supreme Court: case law concerning Section 12 of the Austrian Criminal Code, including 14 Os 88/19a and 11 Os 11/06m. Under this case law, contribution to an offence may consist of physical or psychological support; actual promotion of the commission of the offence is required, while mere presence is insufficient.
- RIS – Tyrolean decision of 22 April 2008: evidence of Austrian legal consideration of attempted animal cruelty under Sections 15 and 222(1)(1) of the Austrian Criminal Code.
Featured image created with ChatGPT based on a prompt by me.
ChatGPT by OpenAI was used as a supporting working tool in the preparation of this article. Its assistance included, in particular, researching publicly available information, organising and comparing sources, reconstructing chronological sequences, and structuring legal and factual connections.
ChatGPT was also used to assist with the linguistic development of the article, the organisation of individual sections, and the review of possible contradictions, open questions and ambiguities.
ChatGPT is not a source for this article. Factual information, legal foundations and expert statements are based exclusively on the publicly available sources listed in the bibliography.
The selection and assessment of information, all editorial decisions, the interpretation of the material, and responsibility for the final version and publication of the article remain with the author.
The English version of this article was translated by ChatGPT from my original German text. The translation was reviewed against the German original to preserve its meaning, structure, tone and legal distinctions as accurately as possible.
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